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PANEL 1: ABORTION AND GAY RIGHTS 
MODERATOR: ERIC SEGALL 
PANELISTS: JONATHAN ADLER, PAM KARLAN, AND MARK 
TUSHNET 
Professor Eric Segall: Good morning. Thanks for coming, 
everybody. One quick apology. We had three of the most prestigious 
Supreme Court reporters in the country, who were supposed to be 
here today: Nina Totenberg, Adam Liptak and Emily Bazelon. On 
Wednesday at around noon, all three called me up and said, “We are 
so sorry, but our bosses are making us stay in D.C. because of the 
Kavanaugh hearing.” I was hoping they would be a buffer to all the 
law professors in the room. But I will play that buffer’s role. I 
apologize for them not being here. 
Today is about discussions not speeches, and we’re going to have 
a conversation. I expect to have thoughtful answers, but I will not 
allow speeches, so I apologize in advance if I cut somebody off. But 
this really is all about having the best kind of informal conversation 
we can have. I am not going to do introductions of our guests other 
than their name and where they teach. These are all accomplished 
people, and their bios would take all day to read. They are in the 
program. I do urge you to read those because the list of 
accomplishments of the people today in this room is staggering. 
There’s going to be a question and answer session during the last 
fifteen minutes or so after every panel. I hope people in the audience 
ask questions. I know our guests will really enjoy that. If you do ask 
a question, there’s a microphone right here in the middle. Please 
introduce yourself and your affiliation. Because, I guess, we are 
being taped for television today, so we should know who’s speaking. 
Our first panel today is about abortion and gay rights. Before I 
introduce the panelists, I just want to say that Justice Kennedy was, 
of course, the dominant and median Justice of our court from 2005 
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when Justices Alito and Roberts replaced Justices O’Connor and 
Rehnquist. In constitutional law, in virtually every 5–4 case decided 
since 2005, Justice Kennedy was in the majority opinion, and in 
many of those he wrote the majority opinion. 
The law of this country today, on affirmative action, abortion, gay 
rights, federalism, separation of powers, the Eleventh Amendment, 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and virtually every other important 
constitutional law issue is the law of Justice Anthony Kennedy. So, 
we’re going to talk a lot about that today, and we’re going to talk 
about how that may change, or likely will change, in the near future. 
Our first panel has Pam Karlan from Stanford Law School, 
Jonathan Adler from Case Western, and Mark Tushnet from Harvard. 
I just want to say that Jonathan kindly stepped in Wednesday 
afternoon around 1:00 when we learned that Nina Totenberg would 
not be able to be on this panel. So, Jonathan, we really appreciate 
that. 
With that, we will begin our conversation. We’ll start with gay 
rights for the first half of this and then go on to abortion. There have 
been four gay rights opinions in the history of the Supreme Court that 
ruled in favor of gays and lesbians, and Justice Kennedy wrote every 
single one of them. My first question is, are there any common 
themes in those four opinions? Feel free to speak up, whoever wants 
to speak up. 
Professor Pamela Karlan: One commonality among them is that all 
four opinions relentlessly refuse to fall into any of the pre-existing 
doctrinal boxes. There were two routes the Court could take on gay 
rights. One is a straightforward substantive due process route, 
focusing on decisional autonomy and the liberty interests involved 
and the other is an equal protection route that either says that it’s 
irrational to treat lesbians and gay men differently than heterosexuals 
or that distinctions based on sexual orientation fails some kind of 
heightened scrutiny. At the end of the four opinions, I don’t think we 
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know much more than we did at the beginning about where exactly, 
doctrinally, you’d put the cases. 
Professor Mark Tushnet: My reaction is that it’s not only that they 
didn’t fall into the any of the pre-existing doctrinal boxes but that 
they don’t fall into any doctrinal box at all. My line on this is that if I 
were to mount a challenge to limiting Medicare to people over 
whatever the relevant age is, I would cite Obergefell because denying 
Medicare to people under age 65 violates their right to equal dignity. 
Professor Karlan: And when they call out in the middle of the night, 
no doctor comes. 
Professor Tushnet: And if I were to challenge Medicare as 
unconstitutional, I’d cite Obergefell. That by forcing people to accept 
charitable care, it violates their right to equal dignity. 
Now, obviously, in Kennedy’s mind, these are not extensions of 
Obergefell. But, why not? I think Mike Dorf is going to say 
something about the lack of doctrinal shape to a great deal of Justice 
Kennedy’s work. My own view is, the lack of doctrinal shape in his 
work makes transparent what’s true of legal doctrine, generally. But, 
I find it striking that Obergefell could mean anything or nothing. If 
it’s doctrine, then you can use it for anything. If it’s a result, the thing 
at the bottom, the thing that says whether it was reversed or affirmed, 
if that’s all it is, fine. 
Professor Segall: Jonathan, you’re probably the most formalist 
person on the stage right now. 
Professor Jonathan Adler: Yeah, I mean, I agree with what’s been 
said in terms of how we understand the opinions, and I think that 
reflects the way I read it, but with Justice Kennedy, you get his issue. 
I also think that the opinions themselves don’t create their own 
doctrinal line at anything more than a very broad level of generality. I 
agree that dignity, and Justice Kennedy’s conception of what it 
means to be treated with equal dignity, is an impulse or a driving 
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force in all the opinions. But, if you try and draw out how that’s 
defined in each of the opinions, it doesn’t quite fit. There are 
overtones of federalism in Windsor. There are issues about 
criminalization in Lawrence. There’s animus in Romer. 
So, if you try and define them with any kind of precision, they 
don’t even fit squarely together, other than they all represent efforts 
to ensure that gay men and lesbians have equal dignity, or greater 
equal dignity, within our society than they had before. 
As trying to figure out what they mean and how they apply, it’s 
challenging. Because, other than appealing to Justice Kennedy and 
his vote, it’s not entirely clear how you mobilize and deploy these 
opinions if you’re trying to convince a lower court judge how to 
decide a case, or other justices, or even teach them to students. 
Professor Karlan: To be fair to Justice Kennedy on this, though, I 
think that the gay rights issue does lie at the intersection of what we 
think of as liberty issues and equality issues. Indeed, I think that even 
separating out the gay rights cases and the abortion cases from one 
another has this same flavor to it. You can talk about both of these as 
equality issues, and you can talk about them as liberty issues, but 
they’re really at the intersection of the two, which is why think of 
these as what I’ve called the stereoscopic part of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Professor Segall: I want to talk about animus in a second, but I don’t 
want to let pass that Justice Thomas, in his dissent in Obergefell, 
criticized Justice Kennedy very, very strongly for his idea of dignity. 
Justice Thomas said, “Dignity is not in the Constitution. The 
government can’t even give dignity. It’s something you have.” I just 
want to make one comment about that: This from the man who joined 
in the invention of colorblindness as a principle for affirmative action 
cases, which is no more in the Constitution than dignity. 
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I think that Justice Kennedy’s lack of doctrine today is going to be 
talked about a lot, but I don’t want to lose sight of the fact that other 
Justices take the same step in very important cases. 
Let’s talk about animus because I believe in all four of those gay 
rights decisions, Justice Kennedy talked about animus. What did he 
mean by that, and how did that apply to these cases? 
Professor Adler: He was clearly concerned—and we see this in 
Masterpiece Cake Shop as well—about what happens in our political 
system, and in our civic life, when policies are motivated by hostility 
to the other, and belief that there are people who sufficiently different 
from the majority that it justifies treating them less well. That’s a 
hard thing to crystallize in a doctrine, but that clearly mattered to 
him, and I think if you think of the timing of the decisions, too, and 
how gay rights was viewed more broadly in our society, you also see 
how one could argue that in each of these cases the issue being 
addressed was on the cusp of where what we might’ve at one time 
thought were neutral policy arguments on a question were really had 
fallen away, and that all that was left to justify a particular policy was 
some sort of animus or hostility to the other. And I think that 
offended him, and he thought that was contrary to what the 
Constitution is supposed to protect and ensure. 
Professor Segall: Justice Scalia felt strongly it was not a 
constitutionally recognizable concept. Do we think it can be applied 
in other—it was applied in one other case, Cleburne a long time ago, 
but other than that, I think animus has only been applied in the gay 
rights cases. Is animus a gay-rights-specific concept? 
Professor Tushnet: Well, I think there are resonances of the idea in 
other settings. Justice O’Connor’s Establishment Clause stuff is—if 
the policy makes outsiders feel like it sends a signal to outsiders that 
they’re outsiders. That’s in the same ballpark. 
I want to make a couple of observations. One is that I’m pretty 
critical of Justice Kennedy as a jurisprude, a doctrinalist. I also think 
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of the last line of Some Like It Hot, where Joey Brown says, 
“Nobody’s perfect,” which actually has interesting gender-policy 
overtones these days. Or, Phil Kurland ended his Harvard foreword 
with a line, “Don’t shoot the piano player. He’s doing the best he 
can.” I think there’s something to that. One aspect of the animus idea 
is a certain degree of empathy that Justice Kennedy could feel for 
some other people. As with everybody, I think, his capacity for 
empathy was limited. I think of Town of Greece v. Galloway where 
he just doesn’t see when Justice Kagan puts it right in front of him, 
he doesn’t see what’s going on. 
And the flip side of seeing animus—being empathetic with the 
targets of animus—the flip side is something that Stephen Smith 
emphasizes, which is you don’t really understand what’s going on in 
the heads of the people who are doing the thing that you think is 
exhibiting animus. I think Smith’s argument is made most clearly, 
and best, in connection with Romer, but it’s true. Whatever his 
capacity for understanding harms of a certain sort, it was, as 
everybody’s is, limited to understanding why people did the things 
that he thought exhibited animus. 
Professor Karlan: I think two things about the animus point. First, 
you could tie it into something that Justice Scalia wrote in his 
concurrence in Cruzan: The Equal Protection Clause requires “the 
majority to accept for themselves and their loved ones what they 
impose on you and me.” I think that notion of equality was animating 
a lot of what Justice Kennedy was talking about in the opinions. But 
the opinions really break, I think, into two separate sets of cases. I 
think of both Romer and Windsor as being very clearly animus cases 
in the sense that those laws were passed out of animus against gay 
people. There’s no question about that. 
A little anecdote about the litigation of Windsor. I was one of the 
lawyers who represented Edie Windsor in the Supreme Court, and 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari on a Friday, on December 7th, 
oddly enough. A day that, for some people, might live in infamy. 
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Saturday morning, first thing, I got an email from my co-counsel 
saying, “We got our first request to file an amicus brief in the case. 
It’s from the Westboro Baptist Church. What should we do?” I said, 
“We should consent.” She said, “Really?” And I said, “Yes, because 
the more people like that file amicus briefs on the other side, the 
clearer it will be that the whole purpose of DOMA was to degrade 
gay people, and that’s something that I think Justice Kennedy will 
really dislike intensely.” 
So, those two cases were really, I think, pure animus cases, 
whereas I think the other two cases, Lawrence and Obergefell, were 
really cases where the law had not changed as people’s understanding 
of gay people had changed. That is, I think if you look back at the 
original history of sodomy laws, they were not about gay people 
directly because there wasn’t yet even the notion that there were 
people of different sexual orientations. They were about acts. 
I think if you go back to the time when marriage statutes were 
passed, I think people were not thinking about gay people and our 
relationships. That was a very different world, and the maintenance 
of marriage restrictions over time may have reflected a kind of 
animus, but the origination of those laws was not in animus in the 
way it was in the other ones. It’s interesting that Justice Kennedy 
used the same concept to deal with both the enactment of the laws 
and the maintenance. 
Professor Segall: I want to ask a question that has nothing to do with 
legal doctrine, or rules, or the law. This might be an uncomfortable 
question, but I want to ask it, anyway. There’s a guy named Gordon 
Schaber, who was Dean of McGeorge Law School and then 
University of Pacific Law School. He was a mentor for Justice 
Kennedy, and they were very, very, very close. To my understanding, 
other than Justice Kennedy’s family, this was the person closest to 
Justice Kennedy. 
This man was a closeted gay man for most of his career and 
seemed to suffer, like most gay men did at the time, a lot of indignity 
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because of that. There are theories that Justice Kennedy’s empathy 
for gays and lesbians arise directly from his very close relationship 
with this person. 
I guess I have two questions. One, do we think that’s right? And 
two, what does that tell us about our country, the Supreme Court, and 
the law? Because it is extremely likely, in my opinion, that if Justice 
Kennedy hadn’t had that mentor, we’d have none of these cases, 
because they were all, except for Romer, they were all 5–4. They 
would’ve gone the other way without Justice Kennedy. 
Professor Karlan: Well, I have no idea what goes on in people’s 
own biographies, but I do think that, as gay people came out of the 
closet, there was a huge difference in the Justices’ understanding of 
gay people. 
I’ll tell just one other little story like this that illustrates this. I was 
clerking the year of Bowers v. Hardwick, and if you went to the 
arguments in the case, as I did, the hypotheticals from the Justices 
were things like, “Well, if we decriminalized homosexual sex, aren’t 
people going to start having sex in bathrooms and in cars?” As if 
straight people never had sex in bathrooms and cars. The whole tenor 
of the courtroom was what it was. The Justices went into Conference 
(I’m not violating any confidence here because these materials 
appear in the public papers of Justice Blackmun). Justice Powell, 
who was the swing vote, said at the Conference, “I don’t think I’ve 
ever met a gay person.” Of course he had. That was then. 
I was also in the Courtroom for the oral arguments in Lawrence. 
After the argument, we were all standing around, and I was standing 
with Walter Dellinger, and Linda Greenhouse, who was then the New 
York Times Supreme Court correspondent, came up to us. Walter 
asked her, “So, what did you think was the most interesting thing 
about the argument?” She looked at him, and without missing a beat, 
she replied, “The Bar section of the Court.” What she meant by that 
was that, I would say a huge number of lesbian, gay, or bisexual law 
clerks from the past had come back, and they were all sitting in the 
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Courtroom in the Bar section. You could see when Justice O’Connor 
walked out, it was like . . . . She looked around the room. 
The Justices knew gay people, and they knew who gay people 
were, and that made a difference to them. The sad thing is that they 
don’t know a lot of poor people; they don’t know a lot of 
undocumented people; they don’t, for the most part, know a lot of 
many other marginalized groups in America. So, they don’t have that 
same empathy for them that they have for gay people. I would just 
love it if they would all wake up one day and discover that their best 
friends were undocumented. I don’t think that’s going to happen, but 
I think that that makes a difference. Whether this particular man is 
the source of Justice Kennedy’s empathy, or whether it’s a whole lot 
of other people, I don’t know, but I do think that makes a difference 
to how Justices think about the cases in front of them. 
You can see this in the cell phone cases, right? It’s not just in this 
area. In the oral argument in United States v. Jones, one of the 
Justices asked something like, “You mean they could put a GPS 
device on my car?” And then the next thing you know, it’s 9–zip. 
Police need a warrant for this. 
So, I think they rely on their own experience in an awful lot of 
areas of law. 
Professor Tushnet: When I was doing my research for my book on 
the Rehnquist Court, I heard—I don’t even know who told it to me—
an anecdote about Justice Kennedy and some gay men he knew. I 
couldn’t pin down the details of the story—the details that were told 
to me actually could not have been true—but the burden of the story 
was that unlike Justice Powell, who didn’t know that he knew gay 
people, Justice Kennedy knew that he knew gay people. The story 
was that they were folks down the block from him. I think that’s 
right. 
I feel like channeling the inner Obama/Sotomayor here. The 
capacity for empathy is an extremely important one. But everybody’s 
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capacity is limited. One of the things that I think we want to look for 
in our best judges is empathy, an awareness of the limits of one’s 
own empathic capacities, and an awareness of the limits of empathy 
as a way of guiding the development of the law. 
Sure, it’s nice, given the outcomes. My point of view is that Justice 
Kennedy had this view of gay people. On the other hand, I’m sorry I 
have to say this, Chief Justice Roberts clearly doesn’t like people to 
say this, but Justice Kennedy joined in the most racist opinion in the 
Supreme Court since Korematsu. Just because he didn’t understand 
what it meant to be a Muslim wanting to come to the United States. 
That’s a bad thing. 
Professor Segall: We’re going to talk about the travel ban case this 
afternoon, for sure, but it does show the limits of Justice Kennedy’s 
empathy. I think that’s right. Jonathan, did you want to add to this? 
Professor Adler: Yes.Far be it from me to want to defend Justice 
Kennedy’s doctrinal approach, but I think it’s not really just about 
empathy. Underlying these opinions, and a lot of what we see in 
Justice Kennedy, is an underlying view about both dignity and 
liberty, which I think really resonates with decisions like Allgeyer, 
that there is this background notion of liberty, and the right to control 
one’s own life, family, pursue one’s own ends, and that if there is a 
group that is part of our broader civic community that is being denied 
that, that is a problem. 
In our modern doctrine, we have a really hard time with that 
because we’re so focused on putting things into the various boxes 
and the various tests, and what’s the relationship between means and 
ends we want for this level of scrutiny, and so on. And that’s not how 
Justice Kennedy is viewing these things. The role that empathy, I 
think, plays here is facilitating the recognition that there are members 
of our community that are not given the opportunity to have that 
same degree of liberty and dignity.But I think a lot of what’s doing 
the work is this background, dare I say it, almost Lochnerian 
conception of liberty. If you go back and look at those cases, they’re 
10
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not really about contract, right? They’re about a kind of autonomy 
and ability to do your own thing even if the majority of the body 
politic thinks it’s weird that you want to teach your kids German, or 
you want to send them to a Catholic school, or whatever else. It’s 
very much that sort of thing. 
I think a lot of what’s doing the work is this background, dare I say 
it, almost Lochnerian conception of liberty. If you go back and look 
at those cases, they’re not really about contract, right? They’re about 
a kind of autonomy and ability to do your own thing even if the 
majority of the body politic thinks it’s weird that you want to teach 
your kids German, or you want to send them to a Catholic school, or 
whatever else. It’s very much that sort of thing. 
So I think the empathy point is just that it makes it easier to 
recognize that that is being denied to a group, but I don’t think that’s 
really the driving impulse if we try and take his jurisprudence on its 
own terms. 
Professor Segall: In none of these cases did Justice Kennedy or the 
Court come out and say gays and lesbians were a suspect class 
similar to people of color or women. And, in none of these cases did 
he formally apply any kind of heightened scrutiny, and my question 
about this is, and it’s hard to answer, would these decisions be safer 
or better accepted if he had done that? I do wonder why the Court 
just didn’t say, once and for all, “Gays and lesbians have been—
history of discrimination, and we’ll give them heightened scrutiny or 
compelling interest test-type analysis.” He never did that. He had the 
votes. The four Liberals would’ve done that; I think we all agree on 
that. Why didn’t he do that? 
Professor Adler: He didn’t want to that, and the other Liberals on 
the Court didn’t want to lose his vote, right? 
Professor Segall: Right. 
Professor Adler: But I don’t think it actually relates to whether these 
decisions are safe. Unlike perhaps the abortion decisions, these 
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decisions are safe. I don’t expect the Court—if Alabama or some 
other state manages to conjure up a scenario to try to challenge these 
statutes, I have a hard time seeing it getting to the Court, and if it gets 
to the Court, I have a hard time seeing anything other than a per 
curiam opinion, given the reliance interests, in particular. I don’t 
think is a battle that more than maybe one or two Justices on the 
Court have any interest in, and I think that’s independent of the 
doctrinal soundness of the opinions or the extent to which they fit 
into our more well-established doctrinal boxes. 
Professor Segall: Do you agree with that? That these decisions are 
safe? 
Professor Karlan: Well, it depends on what you mean by these 
decisions being safe. 
Professor Segall: The same-sex marriage ones. Sorry. 
Professor Karlan: I think the same-sex marriage decision is 
probably safe in the sense that no state is going to be entitled to 
simply deny gay people the right to get married at all. But, there are 
cases that involve things like spousal benefits and the like that I think 
are different. That is, there are some cases where local jurisdictions 
want to deny spousal benefits to gay couples, and there are some of 
these cases working their way through the system. How those cases 
come out is anybody’s guess. There are some cases about rights to 
adopt. Those cases are anyone’s guess. 
There is a case, the Bostick case in which certiorari is being sought 
that raises the question whether Title VII’s prohibition on sex 
discrimination covers gay people. But, even if that statute doesn’t 
protect gay employees, that’s a case that involves a public employer. 
So there’s still the question, as a matter of equal protection, whether 
public employers can discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. 
I don’t think any of those cases have been answered completely by 
the existing cases, but I think the reliance—I think Jonathan’s 
absolutely right. The reliance interest, or if you wanted to go back to 
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what you’re talking about with the earlier liberty idea, the idea that 
the government can take your marriage away from you, strikes me as 
one for which you’re not going to get five votes from among the 
current eight and a half Justices. 
Professor Tushnet: Although, I think that Obergefell is about as 
stable an opinion as there is in the world. 
Professor Karlan: Yes. 
Professor Tushnet: On the other hand, it wouldn’t be difficult to 
write an opinion that said, “Going forward, you can deny marriage to 
gay people, just the ones you have, you can’t overturn.” 
Professor Segall: I will push back a little bit by saying that Justice 
Roberts ended his long dissent in Obergefell by telling people that if 
you’re in favor of same-sex marriage, be happy, but this case has 
nothing to do with the Constitution. That’s what he said. “This case 
has nothing to do with the Constitution.” From the man who came up 
with the equal state sovereignty principle. Anyway, I do think Justice 
Roberts is very good at the long game, and that sentence worries me. 
That sentence worries me. 
Professor Karlan: But given that the Chief Justice does play the 
long game, this does not strike me as one of the issues that is high on 
his list of things he wants to get rid of, despite his angry dissent from 
the bench in Obergefell. This is not affirmative action. This is not 
some of the First Amendment issues. I think society is changing 
awfully fast on this particular issue, in a way that makes it really hard 
for the Court to go back on it. Even if you look at the polling data 
among the most conservative groups in America, people under thirty 
in those groups are at worst evenly divided on same-sex marriage. 
And whereas the culture wars on some of these other issues are going 
forward, this one is past. There’s no political traction, and there’s no 
real political movement, I think. Obviously, things could change, but 
now, I don’t see any real traction in getting rid of same-sex marriage 
going forward. 
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Professor Segall: Before we move on to abortion, I do want to read 
something that Justice Kennedy wrote. This’ll happen a couple times 
today, because we’re talking about Justice Kennedy. We should hear 
his words, I think. Justice Kennedy picked the gay rights decisions, 
all four of them, to make points similar to the point he made in 
Lawrence v. Texas, which I want to read, and this is about something 
broader than gay rights. It’s a famous paragraph. 
He wrote, “Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process 
Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment 
known the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they 
might’ve been more specific. They did not presume to have this 
insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later 
generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in 
fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in 
every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for 
greater freedom.”1 
There’s never been, in my knowledge, a paen to living 
constitutionalism as clear as that paragraph, or a rejection of 
originalism, as clear as that paragraph. That paragraph, I’m sure, 
incensed Justice Scalia as much as anything Justice Kennedy has ever 
written. I am wondering if we have a theory as to why he picked the 
gay-rights cases to make this point over and over again? And was he 
throwing the gauntlet down on, “Originalism is not going to carry my 
vote, and don’t think even think about that for a minute, because it’s 
not going to happen?” 
Any thoughts? Did I stump you? 
Professor Adler: I’m not sure I read that passage quite the same way 
you do. 
Professor Segall: Okay. 
                                                 
1  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003). 
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Professor Adler: I think, especially when you look at Justice 
Kennedy’s federalism opinions, which we can criticize as perhaps 
being not entirely accurate in the way they characterize the original 
understanding of the constitutional structure, they certainly show that 
while Kennedy was not an originalist, he wasn’t an anti-originalist. 
He thought that the original understanding of the structure of the 
Constitution, in particular, was important. There is an argument that 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
was designed to embody this broad, Allgeyer-like conception of 
liberty that Justice Kennedy embraced, and if so, for reasons that 
have already been raised, it’s not anti-originalist to recognize that, 
because of our own failings and our own limited empathy, that we 
will not always understand how the principle that is embodied 
applies, but that’s not to reject the meaning of the text. That’s to 
understand that our own ability to always understand how it applies 
is sometimes limited. So I’m just not sure that’s the gauntlet that you 
think and I’m not sure he’s picking up your cudgel against Scalia in 
that passage. 
Professor Segall: Are you suggesting that if the Fourteenth 
Amendment was originally meant or intended to allow judges to 
change the definition of liberty over time, which is what Justice 
Kennedy is saying, that is, in fact, an originalist view? Because I 
characterize that as the rejection of originalism and originalism are 
exactly the same thing. 
Professor Adler: I’m saying that there isn’t, and I haven’t done the 
research myself, but there certainly are plenty of folks that have done 
research arguing that the Privileges or Immunities Clause embodied 
this broad—I won’t say unlimited—but this broad, capacious, and 
unified conception of liberty that involved the degree of autonomy 
and dignity to go your own way, that had—arguably had—long roots 
in the Anglo-American legal tradition, that, by its nature, would 
never be fully understood at any given point in time because of the 
nature of our ability to understand what those principles mean. And 
I’m just saying that that understanding is not inherently anti-
15
et al.: Panel 1: Abortion and Gay Rights
Published by Reading Room,
886 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:Supp. 
originalist. We can get into a question about, with originalism, at 
what level of generality are we defining things, and so on, but that’s 
my only point. 
Professor Segall: Okay. All right. So, we’ll move on to abortion. 
Something less controversial. Just so we’re all on the same page here, 
in 1989, in the Webster decision, Justice Kennedy didn’t write 
anything, but he joined an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, which 
would have, in fact, overruled Roe v. Wade. Rehnquist didn’t say, 
“We’re going to overturn Roe,” but he wanted to apply a rational 
basis test to abortion restrictions, which would lead to the 
overturning of Roe. Justice Kennedy joined that opinion. There were 
four votes for that opinion. When Justice Thomas replaced Justice 
Marshall in 1991, if you add the four people who joined Webster to 
Justice Thomas, we get five votes, possibly, to overturn Roe v. Wade, 
and then Justice Kennedy famously changed his mind and joined 
with Souter and O’Connor, in Casey, to not overturn Roe v. Wade 
and give us the undue burden test that we currently have today for 
abortion restriction. 
My first question: any theories as to what happened between 1989 
and 1992—it’s three years—that changed Justice Kennedy to an 
“overturn Roe v. Wade” to a “reaffirm, in part, Roe v. Wade?” Any 
theories? We don’t know. 
Professor Karlan: I have no idea. 
Professor Adler: Rehnquist’s opinions were often somewhat brief 
and kind of underdeveloped. As a consequence, even if you thought 
you knew he was he was trying to do, it wasn’t spelled out. If I recall 
correctly, in Webster, Scalia writes separately to complain about that. 
“Yeah, you’re leaving a trail of bread crumbs to overturning Roe, but 
you’re not actually saying it. Rather, what you are saying is, Roe has 
to be limited to account for this interest that we are saying the State 
has in protecting fetal life.” 
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Well, there are parts of Casey which, I think, say quite clearly, 
“We are limiting the right in Roe to accommodate the State’s interest 
in fetal life.” Given that Kennedy didn’t write in Webster, I think it’s 
possible that his read of Rehnquist’s opinion, in some respects, was 
like Scalia’s. That Rehnquist was outlining a path, but because the 
opinion didn’t actually go to the end of that path, you could join that 
opinion without actually committing to taking the next step. And so 
in Casey, we do get this undue burden test that by some 
interpretations, is kind of this balancing: You have the woman’s 
rights here; you have the State’s interests here; and depending on 
where you are in the pregnancy, we balance those interests against 
each other to produce different outcomes. 
Given the underdeveloped nature of Rehnquist’s opinions, I think I 
could make an argument that there’s a continuity there or at least not 
an overt contradiction. 
Professor Tushnet: Two things here One is, I believe that’s it’s in 
Webster, and it’s certainly rattling around in the pre-Casey abortion 
cases. Justice Stevens has this line about the rational basis test, which 
is, “Look, under this test, you could say the State could require a 
woman, before she gets an abortion, to stand on her head and recite 
‘Mary Had A Little Lamb.’” That’s about as close as you can ger to 
saying the doctrinal implication of this is overruling Roe v. Wade. So, 
it’s not as if the idea that this doctrine, taken seriously, would imply 
the invalidity of Roe v. Wade wasn’t around. 
But second, it occurs to me that maybe what’s going on is an 
expression of the same, call it anti-doctrinal impulse, that we see in 
Obergefell. That doctrinal formulations are just the vehicles for 
reaching results in this case, without having implications for other 
cases. I guess one way to think about this is, sort out the things that 
Justice Kennedy thought were undue burden—“Justice Kennedy 
thought” meaning that he joined opinions saying—were undue 
burdens and things that he thought were not undue burdens, and is 
there any coherence to the sorting of them, other than in, say 
17
et al.: Panel 1: Abortion and Gay Rights
Published by Reading Room,
888 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:Supp. 
Gonzalez v. Carhart, this is icky. More icky than other forms of 
abortion, which seems weird to me. 
I think there is in a fair amount—we’ll hear more about this, 
particularly in connection with the First Amendment stuff—but I 
think that there’s a fair amount of anti-doctrinalism in Justice 
Kennedy’s work as a whole, and, then, I think it’s worth pondering 
whether, or to what extent, anti-doctrinalism is a good thing. My 
footnote on this is that I think doctrinalism turns out, on analysis, to 
be anti-doctrinal anyway. So, it might be just as well that Justice 
Kennedy just displays it on the surface of his opinions. But, my 
position is much more controversial and much more difficult to 
develop than I have time here. 
Professor Segall: I will say that we lost our two most famous and 
powerful anti-doctrinal judges—lost, I mean retired—this year in 
Justice Kennedy and Judge Posner. At the end of his career, Judge 
Posner wrote an abortion decision, and others, that were very, very 
anti-doctrinal, and I think losing both of them at the same time is a 
loss to those of us who don’t like doctrine all that much. 
Justice Kennedy is blamed or given credit for the undue burden 
test, but in reality, I believe it was Justice O’Connor who first 
articulated that test. I believe I’m right about that. 
Professor Tushnet: Yeah. 
Professor Segall: It is a vintage Justice O’Connor move, right? 
Because—does anyone in this room know what undue burden means 
in most contexts? I mean, the answer’s going to be, “Ask Justice 
O’Connor.” That ended up playing out to be, “Ask Justice Kennedy.” 
Maybe we should talk about Justice O’Connor’s role in this a little bit 
because I think it was very substantial. Anyone? 
Professor Tushnet: I think her contribution here was to offer a 
verbal formulation that allowed for greater regulation of abortion 
than the doctrinal formulation emerging out of Roe v. Wade. She 
offers the undue burden test. 
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Professor Segall: She came to Georgia State several times, and after 
her retirement, she hinted that she maybe wasn’t that happy with how 
the undue burden test had been implemented. Maybe that wasn’t 
what she was thinking. 
Professor Karlan: One of the areas of law that isn’t scheduled to be 
talked about here, at least explicitly, is the other area where the 
Supreme Court moved from heightened scrutiny to an undue burden 
standard over the course of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts: the 
right to vote. Restrictions on the right to vote used to be subject to 
strict scrutiny, and now there’s an undue burden sliding scale there as 
well. That puts tremendous pressure on who is doing the judging 
because what some people see as undue burdens, other people don’t. 
You can really see this when you look at the lower court opinions 
where there’s a much wider range opinions, particularly at the district 
court level, where single judges decide whether something is an 
undue burden or not. It’s really quite interesting to watch how that 
test gets applied across both these areas of law when you have very 
different people with very different senses of the interaction between 
the ability to exercise these rights and poverty. For most upper-
middle-class women in the country today, there isn’t an undue 
burden on their right to terminate a pregnancy because they have 
private doctors. If worse comes to worse, they can take a day off 
work and go fly someplace. But think about poor women in a part of 
Texas—for example, in Whole Woman’s Health—who would have to 
drive hundreds of miles, and there’s a waiting period, and the like, or 
non-affluent women in the 90% of counties in the United States 
where there is no abortion provider at all. They face a burden. 
There’s much more of an undue burden on poor women than on more 
affluent women. 
This same thing with things like voter ID. It’s much more of a 
burden for a poor person to get an ID, especially if they have to go to 
a DMV, which is located in a place you can drive to, and you don’t 
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have a car, than it is for probably everybody in this room who has a 
currently valid passport so that they can go on vacation overseas. 
Professor Segall: I don’t, this is a sentence I don’t utter very much, 
but to Justice Scalia’s credit, he did, in Casey—I think the strongest 
part of his dissent in Casey is that he predicted this undue burden test 
would be implemented by judges with their own personal views on 
abortion, not the law. I think Justice Scalia’s prediction has come true 
on that. 
Professor Adler: It was true in the Supreme Court as well, right? I 
mean, look at the two Carhart opinions. The three judges that wrote 
the controlling opinion in Casey could not agree among themselves 
what the undue burden test meant in subsequent cases. They were 
able to agree on language in Casey, but I don’t think any of them 
changed their minds in subsequent cases. It’s that they understood 
how that language applied differently. And if they couldn’t agree 
about how that language applied, consistently among themselves, 
how could we ever expect lower court judges to be able to figure out, 
in a consistent way, precisely how that test applies? I think it’s just 
inherent in the way the test was formulated. 
Professor Segall: I want to talk about Gonzalez v. Carhart for a 
minute because we are talking about Justice Kennedy today, and 
Gonzalez, I think, is maybe his most puzzling opinion, or one of his 
most puzzling opinions. For people who are pro-choice, there was a 
lot—maybe even people who aren’t pro-choice—there was a lot of 
language in that decision that he wrote that is strange for him. 
He talked about abortion doctors. It’s a kind of pejorative term. He 
talked about how women suffered depression after having abortions, 
though he said there’s no data to support that, but he said it anyway. 
The entire opinion is written very much in a kind of pro-life rhetoric. 
That doesn’t fit into the rest of his decisions on abortion, I don’t 
think. 
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So, I’m wondering what we think about that, because I know that 
opinion offended a lot of people. Dahlia Lithwick wrote a column 
about that case, I recommend everybody read it. She goes through the 
opinion sentence by sentence and shows how offensive it is if you are 
of a certain point of view. 
That case upheld Congress’s law on “partial-birth abortion” after 
the Court had struck down Nebraska’s law, and it was just a change 
in votes not a change in doctrine. Any thoughts on that? 
Professor Tushnet: I have one observation that I wanted to make 
earlier, which is, in some ways, the disadvantage imposed on us as 
scholars of both knowing the people who we’re talking about and, in 
some instances, having been there, or having been there working with 
them, which we mostly have internalized as norms about proper 
disclosures and the kinds of things we can say, or ought to say, about 
this person we work with and so on. 
I met Justice Kennedy once in my life, so I’m free of that, but I, in 
writing about Justice Marshall, felt constraints. I still think what I’ve 
written is, on a sort of interpretive level, better than what most other 
people have written, but I felt some constraints. In this particular 
context, I would want to know who drafted those words. 
One of the things that we never talk about is the extent to which 
the words published in the U.S. Reports come from the pen of the 
person whose name is attached to the opinion. We all know that the 
proportion ranges from 0% to 100%. We don’t know or those who 
know are unwilling to say about particular things what the actual 
proportion is. 
On this, could be that the clerk who was assigned to this opinion 
had strong pro-life views, and it was natural for that clerk to write in 
that way. Justice Kennedy either didn’t notice, or didn’t care, or 
wanted to maintain a relationship with a law clerk. Maybe they’re 
Justice Kennedy’s lines—words—but maybe they’re not. 
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Professor Karlan: I have a slightly different take. One  of the 
interesting evolutions, and it’s going on at the same time as the 
doctrine is moving, is the shift back and forth between what the 
purpose of restrictions on abortions is. The words that he’s writing in 
Gonzalez v. Carhart are coming at a time when there’s this inflection 
point between the claim that the purpose of regulations on abortions 
is to preserve fetal life, or has something to do with the idea that life 
begins at conception, and a quite different theory: that the restrictions 
are designed to protect women, an ostensibly “feminist” theory of 
abortion restrictions. 
This case comes right around the time that those two things are 
both going on. So the opinion gets written from the point of view of 
Justice Kennedy asking himself, “If I were a woman, how would I 
feel about this particular kind of abortion?” That requires a lot of 
levels of hypothesizing one on top of the next. 
I don’t know exactly how that plays out here, but I do think that 
the argument, and you get to this obviously and most strongly in 
Whole Woman’s Health, is it’s hard to take seriously a 
woman-protective rationale for abortion that says, “No woman could 
ever want an abortion, and therefore, we’re just going to close down 
all of the abortion clinics in Texas.” But that was what Texas was 
claiming, right? So, if you take their rationale seriously, their 
purported rationale for those restrictions, it’s really hard to uphold 
them. But I think there’s a lot going with respect to this question of 
why exactly we regulate abortion and in the service of which 
particular values. 
Professor Tushnet: I think that simultaneously credits the rationales 
with more than they are worth and undervalues the motivation for 
offering those rationales. That is, my view is that— 
Professor Karlan: Oh, I think they’re both strategic. 
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But the arguments that people make and the way that the cases 
play out are quite different depending on what the rationale is that’s 
offered. 
Professor Tushnet: Well, but the strategic point is how do we who 
believe that abortion is murder persuade people who don’t have that 
belief to nonetheless uphold restrictions to the point of a complete 
prohibition on abortion? 
Professor Karlan: Right. 
Professor Tushnet: Then you have to ask not why is there this shift 
in the rhetoric to the pro-woman but what is it that leads pro-life 
people to believe that this rhetorical shift from rhetoric A, which 
hasn’t yet succeeded, to rhetoric B, will succeed? What are they 
thinking about the targets of the rhetoric that they’re generating? 
Professor Karlan: But that’s what I just said. 
Professor Segall: Okay, we can—we’ll go with that. In the last few 
months, two different Courts of Appeals have upheld laws 
substantially identical—similar—to the laws the Supreme Court 
struck down in Whole Woman’s Health just a couple years ago. They 
did so making distinctions that none of us would find persuasive. 
What do we think is the future of this? Because certainly these two 
different Courts of Appeals, the Fifth Circuit and I believe the Tenth 
or the Eighth, are really saying to the Supreme Court, “We don’t 
view Whole Woman’s Health as binding. We’re not going to follow 
it.” They upheld laws that were struck down. 
Professor Adler: As a start, I think it’s worth noting that I think 
Justice Kennedy certainly thought Gonzalez v. Carhart was 
consistent with Casey. I think one can find plenty in Casey to support 
not just the outcome in Gonzalez v. Carhart but also the rhetorical 
moves. 
What’s interesting about Whole Woman’s Health is not, to me, at 
least, is not Kennedy’s vote, but Kennedy’s decision to assign the 
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opinion to Breyer because the framework and the way it’s applied, --
the way Justice Breyer understands undue burden, and discusses 
undue burden, and applies undue burden-- is a break from the way it 
was articulated in Casey, and certainly in the way it was understood 
and applied by Kennedy in Gonzalez v. Carhart. I think when you 
see that, doctrinally, in any area, lower courts have a difficult time 
because they may see a certain continuity, and then they see an 
opinion that breaks that continuity. The question is, do we have to re-
understand this whole doctrinal line, or do we assume that that’s an 
outlier? 
I think when you combine that with the fact that there are clearly 
quite a few judges that have a disagreement with or a hostility to the 
entire abortion jurisprudence since Roe, you would expect this. 
Knowing how to understand the undue burden test, post-Whole 
Woman’s Health, is hard because Whole Woman’s Health is Breyer’s 
formulation. It’s not the formulation we had been trying to make 
sense of for the preceding twenty-five years. 
Professor Segall: But it is more rigorous, though. I mean, you would 
think that Justice Kennedy’s—Breyer’s analysis is more heightened 
scrutiny than undue burden, I think. 
Professor Adler: Well, it’s this kind of balancing. It’s a way of 
approaching means/ends balancing, which we see in a lot of Justice 
Breyer’s jurisprudence, that is different than the way at least a lot of 
lower courts had understood undue burden to work up until that time. 
We see this in lots of doctrinal areas where you see the one case that 
marks a departure from the way a doctrine had been understood. You 
often see lower courts spending some time, sometimes struggling, to 
figure out how to account for that departure and how to make sense 
of it. When you add to that the underlying resistance to the doctrine 
to begin with, we shouldn’t be surprised to see these sorts of 
decisions. 
Professor Tushnet: Just one point about these recent opinions and 
one more general point. The recent opinions—I don’t recall whose 
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analysis this was, it’s not mine, originally—say, “Let’s look at what 
Breyer said in Whole Woman’s Health. Here are the kinds of things 
he said we have to take it into account. Some of the things that were 
taken into account in Whole Woman’s Health were Texas-specific. 
Other things were general scientific stuff.” The critique of these other 
more recent opinions is that they reevaluate the non-state-specific 
information that was used in Whole Woman’s Health. That’s different 
from saying, “We take those general things to be established, but in 
doing the balancing, the state-specific things come out differently, 
lead to a different outcome.” They challenge the non-state-specific 
stuff. That’s the difficulty. 
For the more general point is, I think the relevant case to be 
thinking about here is Janus. That is, what are the conditions for 
overruling? Suppose one of these Eighth or Fifth Circuit cases gets to 
the Supreme Court, and they decide to grant review on it. That’s also 
a contingent question. If they grant review, are they going to say, 
“Well, let’s go through Whole Woman’s Health and see if this really 
is an undue burden,” or are they going to say, “Let’s think about 
overruling it, and what did we say about overruling decisions in 
Janus?” You go through the five or six criteria in Janus, and they are 
all satisfied with respect to Roe v. Wade, with one exception of the 
reliance discussion, which was the weakest discussion in Casey 
anyway. 
I think that, depending on one’s time horizon, probably 
unproductive to worry much about the application of the undue 
burden test in particular cases. I’m not saying that the Court’s going 
to overrule Roe next year or in two years or three years. But, with a 
changed composition, assuming that it occurs, I don’t think there’s 
any question about whether Roe will be overruled or not, Senator 
Collins notwithstanding. 
Professor Segall: All right. Two comments before we take 
questions. One is, I think these lower court decisions might anger 
Chief Justice Roberts because I don’t think they fairly interpret 
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Whole Woman’s Health at all. I think they basically don’t follow 
them at all. That may or may not make Chief Justice Roberts mad as 
an institutionalist protecting the Court’s integrity. 
I was asked by a reporter yesterday if I thought the Supreme Court, 
assuming Kavanaugh gets confirmed, would reach out to decide 
issues involving women in the next couple of years, and how 
controversial would that be, if they have five votes, to do something 
to Roe, or some other case involving sexual harassment or 
discrimination against women. Would these Justices do that in the 
next two or three years? I’m pretty sure they would not, based on 
something you said a long time ago, which is, “Try to imagine a New 
York Times headline, and if you can’t, then the Court probably won’t 
do it.” It’s hard to imagine with Kavanaugh getting on the bench, this 
Supreme Court doing something dramatic that’s perceived to hurt the 
interests of women in the next few years. Could be wrong. 
With that, questions from the audience. Please come to this 
podium here. Introduce yourself, and we’ll take it from there. 
Professor Adler: If I could just, really quick, while people are lining 
up. 
Professor Segall: Yes. 
Professor Adler: I think we have to think, too, about what leads 
cases to go to the Court. It’s not clear to me that abortion-rights 
groups are going to file cert. petitions for fear of an opinion that 
would, at the very least, narrow Casey, or severely constrain Whole 
Woman’s Health, and so on. The real question will be whether or 
when a State law gets struck down, I’m not sure the Court accepts 
those cases when a State seeks cert. in the near term. So, in the short-
term horizon, it’s not clear to me how soon one of these cases gets to 
the Court. 
Professor Segall: I agree with that. 
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Professor Michael C. Dorf: I’m Mike Dorf; I’ll be on the next 
panel. So, I have one tiny little point, and then kind of a 
comment/question. Earlier in the discussion of the gay rights cases, 
the question came up whether the Court had applied this animus idea 
elsewhere. One case that wasn’t mentioned was a per curiam from 
2000 called Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, which involved a 
so-called class-of-one discrimination. There was discrimination 
against just one woman. The issue was whether that kind of 
allegation states an equal protection claim. The Court said “Yes.” 
Breyer wrote a concurrence in the per curiam saying that the lower 
court actually preserved a claim that the village’s decision was based 
on animus toward this woman in particular. The village made her 
give a thirty-some-odd-foot easement when everyone else had to give 
a fifteen-foot easement. She says that the people in the village who 
run the village hated her. So, Breyer says, “You can’t do that. That’s 
animus.” 
Interestingly, Kennedy didn’t join Breyer’s concurrence. I’m not 
sure what we make of that, but that was interesting to me. 
The other point was on the nature of the undue burden test. 
Jonathan said, correctly, that Breyer’s version of the test in Whole 
Woman’s Health is not exactly the earlier version from Casey. 
However, the earlier version is not remotely O’Connor’s still-earlier 
version. O’Connor’s version in dissents in a couple of cases in the 
1980s said, “We don’t even apply strict scrutiny, or any kind of 
heightened scrutiny, unless the law first passes a threshold of unduly 
burdening the right to abortion.” 
That’s not what the plurality opinion says in Casey. What they say 
in Casey is, “undue burden is a shorthand for the outcome of this sort 
of test, which you see whether the burden is substantial.” Thus, the 
test has changed at least twice. But that isn’t especially unusual to 
this area. Think about the way in which strict scrutiny evolves in 
affirmative action cases. People take the preexisting tests, and they 
move with them. The question then is whether that’s a reason to be 
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skeptical of all doctrine, as Mark is, or is it just to say, well, that’s the 
nature of a common law system. 
My question is, is that a feature or a bug? 
Professor Adler: The description is right. The common law aspect, I 
think, is an important part, because you’re writing an opinion to 
explain the doctrinal application given a particular set of facts that 
have been presented and particular arguments that have been 
presented. While you may be trying to articulate the underlying 
principle in a way that will enable lower courts and future courts to 
do something consistent, it’s necessarily going to be underdeveloped 
in future cases, especially the cases that reach the Supreme Court 
because, for a whole bunch of reasons, those are the cases that are 
most likely to have been the least controlled or least dictated. And so 
that is an—and whether that’s a feature or a bug of the system, I 
would just say that that’s the way the system works, and we have to 
make the best of it. There are positives to it; there are negatives to it. 
Professor Segall: Before we get to the next question, I do feel 
obligated—because this is being shown on C-SPAN at some point, 
other places—to mention, in light of Mark’s comment earlier that 
Mike Dorf, who just asked that question, was Justice Kennedy’s law 
clerk during the term that Casey was decided. Not suggesting 
anything Mike just said reflects anything about what actually 
happened during that time, but I do think it shouldn’t go without 
passing. 
All right. Next person. 
Professor Eugene Volokh: Hi. Eugene Volokh from UCLA. I was 
going to say the same thing that Mike said, so let me elaborate a little 
bit on it because I think it’s important, in part, because whatever 
flaws there may be in Casey, I think criticizing the undue burden test, 
it seems to me, has become a cottage industry in ways that I’m not 
sure is entirely justified. Mike has written about this. There’s also 
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Alan Brownstein at UC Davis. He wrote an excellent article about 
this. 
Here’s a possible hypothesis. For pretty much every substantive, 
non-equality right, the Court adopts some form of substantial burden 
test. The undue burden test, as somebody quoted, the three-Justice 
opinion in Casey says, “It suddenly has the purpose or effect of 
interposing substantial obstacle.” So, that’s basically the substantial 
burden test. 
If you look at ballot-access cases, there’s a substantial burden 
threshold. Traditional right to marry cases, like Zablocki v. Redhail, 
substantial burden threshold, which helps explain why certain 
marriage-license fees aren’t struck down, marriage waiting periods, 
and such. Indeed, for voting rights, historically, one of the things for 
registration waiting periods, one inquiry has been on how 
burdensome they are. The emerging Second Amendment case law is 
chock full of discussion of whether something is really a very serious 
restriction on abortion or a less than substantial burden. Time, place, 
and manner restrictions in free speech law don’t say substantial 
burden, but they ask if something leaves open ample alternative 
channels. That is, in effect, as Alan Brownstein pointed out, a 
substantial burden test because if it leaves open alternative channels 
then the theory is it’s only a modest burden. 
So, if that’s so, doesn’t it make sense that, difficult as it is to draw 
the substantiality line, but that abortion rights would have a similar 
threshold requirement to try to distinguish what are seen as, rightly or 
wrongly, as a modest burden from ones that really go to the heart of 
the right? 
Professor Karlan: I don’t think anybody disagrees with any of that. 
The question is, what counts as a burden? What’s interesting is the 
retreat on the Court from thinking about things that actually burden 
the right. So, that’s why I said that the action is all in who is applying 
these tests. Because if you read, for example, Judge Myron 
Thompson’s abortion decision from Alabama, he talks about just how 
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difficult it is for a woman to get to the places where abortion is still 
allowed, and he has to spend a lot of time going through a whole lot 
of GIS expert testimony about just how hard it is, and how costly it 
is, and how long it takes. I don’t think that people on the left would 
have a problem with an undue burden test if it was applied by people 
who took into account the actual situation of the lives of the people 
who are being burdened. That’s not the problem. 
I would have no trouble with an undue burden test at all if it was 
applied by people who understood the burdens on the actual people’s 
lives who are affected. What tends to happen instead, though, is that 
it’s abstracted up to a level where you think to yourself, “Well, if it 
wouldn’t be an undue burden for me, then it’s not undue.” That’s, I 
think, where the trouble is. I don’t think people think that abortion 
jurisprudence is unique here, and I think you’re right in pointing that 
out. For example, when courts talk about these things in the context 
of voter ID, different courts have very different views, depending on 
whether they think it’s actually a burden on poor people to make 
them spend $32. 
I had a witness on the stand in my voter ID case when I was 
working at DOJ who said her cash income per month is $300. So, for 
her, $32 to get an ID and three hours on buses to go and get it is an 
undue burden. I guarantee you, there are a huge number of judges— 
Judge Posner before he had his recantation on this—who just thought 
everybody has an ID. How difficult could it be to get one? Well, if 
you were born at home, and you don’t have a birth certificate, it’s 
really difficult. If your parents were illiterate, so they misspelled your 
name on the birth certificate, it’s really difficult. If you don’t have the 
sophistication to understand how to deal with government 
bureaucracies, it’s really difficult. 
The same thing is true of abortion. What’s distressing about the 
Supreme Court is that, unless you spend huge amounts of money, and 
millions of dollars were spent on Whole Woman’s Health by 
foundations that funded the litigation, you would not have had the 
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data in the record there that would enable you to show what the 
burden is, and that’s what makes an undue burden test so frustrating 
for people who believe in the underlying right. The undue burden test 
requires a kind of litigation that is very difficult to do. 
Professor Tushnet: This is responsive to the bug/feature point, but I 
think Eugene’s comment brings it out. I’ve been waiting for years to 
do this. This reminds me of the scene in Chinatown, “She’s my 
daughter. She’s my sister.” It’s a feature, and it’s a bug. It’s a feature 
of legal reasoning, and the bug is, it’s entirely dependent on who is 
doing the reasoning. 
Professor Segall: I do want to mention that Eugene Volokh, who just 
asked that question, clerked for Justice O’Connor in the 1980s. I’m 
not sure exactly when. 
We have time for maybe one more question. I’m sorry, Ilya. 
Esmat Hanano: Good morning. Esmat Hanano. I am on the Law 
Review here. So, I had a pretty great Constitutional Law II professor, 
and we talked a lot about the messiness surrounding the gay rights 
decisions and Justice Kennedy’s writing focusing on animus. My 
question’s kind of predictive. I know you all said that the decisions 
are safe and nothing to worry about, but looking forward, who would 
step into his role and take the charge for gay rights, and what would 
be the test that should be applied going forward? Do you see the 
liberal wing hardening their stance and saying, “We need to push for 
heightened scrutiny,” or calling back to the earlier opinions? 
Professor Adler: There’s no replacing Justice Kennedy on these 
issues. Whether you like or dislike his approach, there were features 
in the way he approached these cases, wrote about these cases-- 
because he wrote the opinions, laid out—there isn’t anyone on the 
Court that’s going to do that. Are there reasons to believe that the 
Chief Justice, for example, might be particularly resistant to 
overturning or undermining certain aspects of some of these cases 
due to his concern about maintaining continuity? Perhaps. But you’re 
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not going to see a Chief Justice Roberts opinion that remotely 
resembles a Kennedy opinion. I mean, that’s just not going to 
happen. 
Professor Karlan: Until gay people become states, at which point, 
he’ll talk about their equal dignity. 
Professor Tushnet: There are two things. One is on what I think of, 
somewhat disparagingly, the mopping-up issues: the spousal benefits, 
the adoption issues. There’s nobody going to replace Kennedy, and 
the odds are that cases will come out to say, “Well, we said gay 
marriage, but we didn’t say any of these other things.” Maybe one or 
two of them will say, “Yes, you have to provide spousal benefits,” 
and those will be assigned randomly with the— 
Professor Adler: Or they’ll be per curiam. 
Professor Tushnet: I just want to note, if a direct challenge is 
brought, it wouldn’t be surprising to see Chief Justice Roberts doing 
a Chief Justice Rehnquist in Dickerson, “Of course, I thought 
Miranda was wrongly decided, and I still do, but you can’t come in 
our face even though we said you could. We’re going to reaffirm 
Miranda.” Similarly with Obergefell, were there to be a direct 
challenge. 
Professor Karlan: One thing I’d like to say to you because you’re in 
law school now is that when I was in law school, Georgia still had a 
sodomy statute that made it a twenty-year sentence for anyone who 
engaged in oral or anal sex, regardless of the sex of their partner, but 
it was obviously applied differently. When I was clerking, the 
Supreme Court decided Bowers v. Hardwick, so if you take a slightly 
longer view of this, where the Supreme Court will be when you’re 
the age of the people on the panel, and what the Supreme Court’s 
approach to gay rights will be at that state, is very different than over 
the next short term. 
One of the things you should be thinking about is, where do you 
want to move the Court over your professional lifetime? You should 
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be thinking about more than just where is the Court going to be over 
the next five or ten years. History’s longer than that. 
Professor Segall: All right. 
Professor Karlan: I hope. 
Professor Segall: Ilya, if you can be quick, you can have the last 
word. 
Professor Ilya Somin: Just a quick question. 
Professor Segall: Identify yourself first. 
Professor Somin: Sure. Ilya Somin, George Mason University. The 
question actually relates to the first part of your discussion about the 
gay-rights cases that, as you and a lot of people mentioned, is not 
clear to have much doctrinal coherence, but—and I’ve criticized 
them on this basis myself—but maybe what’s really going on is a 
confluence of several things that come together in the gay rights 
cases, like it’s a group with a seemingly mutable characteristic, 
they’re the object of prejudice, the rights and questions in many cases 
involve intimate or very private behavior, it’s very important to 
people’s ongoing liberty and autonomy, and so on. 
Kennedy mentions all these elements in his different opinions. But, 
he’s reluctant, or he was reluctant, to tell us what would happen if 
some of these elements were there but other ones were not. This also 
has the advantage from the point of view of some of the Justices, 
perhaps, of ensuring that these precedents are not easy to use outside 
the gay-rights area, where maybe only one or two or three of these 
elements are present. 
Could they perhaps be explained by the idea that this is a 
confluence of several different things which come together here, and 
they didn’t want to tip their hand or didn’t agree on what should be 
done in situations where some of these elements are present but not 
others? 
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Professor Adler: I was going to say it also could be a concern about, 
even within the gay rights area. I think Masterpiece Cake Shop, 
which we haven’t talked about, illustrates this: A recognition that one 
consequence of putting things into clear, doctrinal boxes is that the 
implications for other cases become more clear, more determinant, 
and the hydraulic pressure for certain outcomes follows. So, if his 
concern is, this is a particular affront to equal dignity that has to be 
overturned, but I’m really not sure how questions relating to gay 
rights should play out in the anti-discrimination context, or in context 
where there might be issues with religious objection, or wherever 
else, not putting things in a doctrinal box makes it easier to reserve 
those questions. 
I don’t think it’s just an issue of implications outside of the gay 
rights area. It’s quite possible that it’s a recognition that defining the 
doctrinal categories puts in motion a set of outcomes that it’s quite 
possible Justice Kennedy wasn’t sure what he thought the outcome in 
those other sorts of cases should be, and Masterpiece Cake Shop 
might reflect that, right? An ambivalence about precisely how to 
balance these competing concerns. You get the sense that Justice 
Kennedy, had he been on the Court, would’ve been happy to revisit 
that and may have had more firm conclusions five or ten years from 
now, but he wasn’t ready to fully cast his lot now. 
Professor Segall: We will talk about Masterpiece Cake Shop at 
lunch, but I have to leave it there. Mark, do you want the last word? 
Professor Tushnet: Suppose you offered that analysis of Obergefell 
in your class, and then you said to a student, “Well, here. Let’s 
consider a spousal-benefits case, where one of these elements is 
absent. What is the implication of Obergefell for this spousal-benefits 
case?” Your student says, “Beats me.” Now, either that’s an 
incredibly sophisticated student or a student who you were going to 
say, “You ought to think some more about what legal reasoning is.” 
That’s the anti-doctrinal critique of Obergefell, that doctrine is 
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supposed to provide some guidance beyond the particular case at 
hand. 
Now there are strategic reasons for reserving some issues, but 
those are—when you do that, it is, I would say, a defect. I have to 
say, I feel like I’m coming out of the 1950s tradition of legal 
reasoning when I do this sort of stuff, but I think they were right. 
Professor Segall: I think “beats me” is the right answer.  
All right. Thank you very much, panel. We’re going to try to stay 
on schedule, so we’ll take a fifteen-minute break, and then we’ll 
come back. 
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